The system that was upheld in Grutter considered a number of other factors to assure diversity of not only race but also socioeconomic status, skills, and so forth. Post, at 38. The President of the United States dispatched the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock, Arkansas, and federal troops were needed to enforce a desegregation decree. The Court deferred to local authorities in making its determination, noting that in inquiring into reasonableness there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. Ibid. The Nations schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 26869. 32 (2004); A Great Decision, Hindustan Times (New Dehli, May 20, 1954), p.5; USA Takes Positive Step, West African Pilot (Lagos, May 22, 1954), p. 2 (stating that Brown is an acknowledgment that the United States should set an example for all other nations by taking the lead in removing from its national life all signs and traces of racial intolerance, arrogance or discrimination). The State Supreme Court wrote: Despite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate the severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts, and despite the fact that the defendants did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the disparities that continue to burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity. Id., at 42, 678 A. The dissent refers to an opinion filed by Judge Kozinski in one of the cases now before us, and that opinion relied upon an opinion filed by Chief Judge Boudin in a case presenting an issue similar to the one here. But the Seattle schools had never been segregated by law; and the Kentucky schools, though previously segregated by law, had their desegregation decree dissolved by a District Court in 2000 on the finding the school district had "eliminated the vestiges associated with the former policy of segregation and its pernicious effects". For his part, Justice Thomas faults my citation of various studies supporting the view that school districts can find compelling educational and civic interests in integrating their public schools. The districts argue that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself. Today, they are not. No. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools, sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. Public School Dist., pp. After he had enrolled and after the academic year had begun, he then applied to transfer to his preferred school after the kindergarten assignment deadline had passed, id., at 21, possibly causing school officials to treat his late request as an application to transfer to the first grade, in respect to which the guidelines apply. These cases consider the longstanding efforts of two local school boards to integrate their public schools. in No. It established that the decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Applying these precedents to K-12 education, the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored. This refers back to a time when public schools were highly segregated, often as a result of legal or administrative policies that facilitated racial segregation in public schools. Garfield was the only oversubscribed school whose composition during the 19992000 school year was within the racial guidelines, although in previous years Garfields enrollment had been predominantly nonwhite, and the racial tiebreaker had been used to give preference to white students. Post, at 3436 (citing 426 F.3d 1162, 11931194 (CA9 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 2829 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring)). 05915, at 97. Justice Breyers dissent next looks for authority to a footnote in Washington v. Seattle School Dist. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. The Washington Supreme Court issued its decision on the same day the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, the seminal cases which addressed the constitutionality of using race in college and law school admissions at the University of Michigan. It also contends that racial diversity is too amorphous and uncertain a concept to be considered a compelling interest, and finally disputes as inconclusive the Districts statistics regarding the increased success rates of students in integrated schools. These plans are more narrowly tailored than the race-conscious law school admissions criteria at issue in Grutter. 458 U. S., at 472, n. 15. At the state level, 46 States and Puerto Rico have adopted policies that encourage or require local school districts to enact interdistrict or intradistrict open choice plans. (This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children). ), appeal dismd for want of a substantial federal question, 484 U. S. 804 (1987). (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. And some have concluded that there are no demonstrable educational benefits. It was from this decision that the Parents Involved in Community Schools applied for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Seattle public schools have not shown they were ever segregated by law, and were not subject to court ordered desegregation decrees. My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlans view in Plessy: Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). In 1963, at the insistence of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other community groups, the school board adopted a new race-based transfer policy. When it comes to government race-based decisionmaking, the Constitution demands more. 4 Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. The board opposed dissolution, arguing that the old dual system had left a demographic imbalance that prevent[ed] dissolution. In 2000, after reviewing the present plan, the District Court dissolved the 1975 order. 1011. Both cases present the same underlying legal questionwhether a public school that had not operated legally segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school assignments. Id., at 499, 504; Wygant, supra, at 274 (plurality opinion); cf. Moreover, the democratic interest has no durational limit, contrary to Grutters command. And it thereby set the Nation on a path toward pub-lic school integration. Post, at 41. See supra, at 2224. This Court has carved out a narrow exception to that general rule for cases in which a school district has a history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race.[Footnote 4] See Swann, 402 U. S., at 56. Id. And even if the determination is difficult, it is one the dissent acknowledges must be made to determine what remedies school districts are required to adopt. And if this is a frustrating duality of the Equal Protection Clause it simply reflects the duality of our history and our attempts to promote freedom in a world that sometimes seems set against it. Justice Thomas suggests that it will be easy to identify de jure segregation because [i]n most cases, there either will or will not have been a state constitutional amendment, state statute, local ordinance, or local administrative policy explicitly requiring separation of the races. Ante, at 6, n.4 (concurring opinion). 2d 290, 294 (1967); Booker v. Board of Ed. This will surely, however, restrict school districts efforts to achieve diversity and the benefits that arguably come with it. Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered. majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts and in the The Jefferson County Board of Education fails to meet this threshold mandate. See Powell 35. The new policy added an explicitly racial criterion: If a place exists in a school, then, irrespective of other transfer criteria, a white student may transfer to a predominantly black school, and a black student may transfer to a predominantly white school. 420, p.25. Both parents appealed the Districts placement but were unable to have their children reassigned. In fact, six of the Seattle high schools involved in this case were built by the 1920s; the other four were open by the early 1960s. Jefferson County estimates that the racial guidelines account for only 3 percent of assignments. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 460 (1982). In my view, to defer to ones preferred result is not to defer at all. But with reference to schools, the effect of the legal wrong proved most difficult to correct. And statements of a legal rule set forth in a judicial opinion do not always divide neatly into holdings and dicta. (Consider the legal status of Justice Powells separate opinion in Regents of Univ. Segregation at the time of Brown gave way to expansive remedies that included busing, which in turn gave rise to fears of white flight and resegregation. 6704 (WD Wash., 1969), pp. 06AppsChoicesBoardApril2005final.pdf. 1, supra); Hanawalt 3638, 40; Siqueland 3, 184, Table 4. Id., at 21. [citation needed]. 420, 433434 (1988). Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of history. First, there is a historical and remedial element: an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. Despite his argument that these cases should be evaluated under a standard of review that is not strict in the traditional sense of that word, post, at 36, Justice Breyer still purports to apply strict scrutiny to these cases. What has happened to stare decisis? The Seattle school districts Website formerly contained the following definition of cultural racism: Those aspects of society that overtly and covertly attribute value and normality to white people and whiteness, and devalue, stereotype, and label people of color as other, different, less than, or render them invisible. . Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. As the Court explained, [t]he importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount. Ibid. Meredith joined a pending lawsuit filed by several other plaintiffs. R. Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black Americas Struggle for Equality, p. x (1975) (arguing that perhaps no other Supreme Court case has affected more directly the minds, hearts, and daily lives of so many Americans); Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education xxvii (2001) (identifying Brown as the most eagerly awaited and dramatic judicial decision of modern times). As McDaniel and Harris show, that is historically untrue. The opinion of the Court and Justice Breyers dissenting opinion (hereinafter dissent) describe in detail the history of integration efforts in Louisville and Seattle. (explaining why dicta is not binding). To make race matter now so that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to overcome. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education ( PICS ). In addition, Meredith sought damages in her complaint, which is sufficient to preserve our ability to consider the question. For the next decade, annual program transfers remained at approximately this level. If the plans survive this strict review, they would survive less exacting review a fortiori. By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II) (Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems. 2d, at 844845, nn. Seattle provides three forward-lookingas opposed to remedialjustifications for its race-based assignment plan. in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. Compton, California, on the other hand, became over 99 percent black in the 1980s, while Buffalo, New York had a virtual 5050 split between white and minority students prior to its 1977 plan. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 507 (1989); Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. On appeal, a three-judge panel the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, but upon en banc rehearing the court affirmed the lower court decision. & Rodgers, Coercion to Compliance: Southern School Districts and School Desegregation Guidelines, 38 J. Bowen & Bok 155. Whenever the board finds that racial imbalance exists in a public school, it shall give written notice to the appropriate school committee, which shall prepare a plan to eliminate imbalance and file a copy with the board. The panel determined that while achieving racial diversity and avoiding racial isolation are compelling government interests, id., at 964, Seattles use of the racial tiebreaker was not narrowly tailored to achieve these interests, id., at 980. . No. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. [Footnote 5] Rejecting arguments comparable to those that the plurality accepts today,[Footnote 6] that court noted: It would be the height of irony if the racial imbalance act, enacted as it was with the laudable purpose of achieving equal educational opportunities, should, by prescribing school pupil allocations based on race, founder on unsuspected shoals in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 698, 227 N.E. 2d, at 733 (footnote omitted). The minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments, however, suggests that other means would be effective. If that is so, then all of Seattles earlier (even more race-conscious) plans must also have been unconstitutional. Narrow tailoring requires "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives", Grutter, supra, at 339, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. First, the school districts plans serve compelling interests and are narrowly tailored on any reasonable definition of those terms. See, e.g., Armor & Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public Schools, in Beyond the Color Line: New Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America 239, 251 (A. Thernstrom & S. Thernstrom eds. of Ed., 439 U. S. 1380, 1383 (1978). The issue in Gratz arose, moreover, in the context of college admissions where students had other choices and precedent supported the proposition that First Amendment interests give universities particular latitude in defining diversity. See id., at 1032 (discussing other successful black schools); Walker, Can Institutions Care? PICS counters that neighborhood demographics are the result of individuals voluntary choices, and that parents tend to choose schools near their home. The Courts decision in that case was a grievous error it took far too long to overrule. The Ninth Circuit below stated that it share[d] in the hope expressed in Grutter that in 25 years racial preferences would no longer be necessary to further the interest identified in that case. 2d 304, and yet in Seattle several alternative assignment plansmany of which would not have used express racial classificationswere rejected with little or no consideration. 935, 937 (1989) (calling Brown the Supreme Courts greatest anti-discrimination decision); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Brown, 347 U. S. 483; Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. A racial imbalance determination requires the district to submit a plan to correct the racial imbalance, which plan may include mandatory pupil reassignment. 10226e5(a) and (c)(4). The dissent acknowledges that the two-sentence discussion in Swann was pure dicta, post, at 22, but nonetheless asserts that it demonstrates a basic principle of constitutional law that provides authoritative legal guidance. Post, at 22, 30. Fifty-three of the 125 studied districts used transfers as a component of their plans. It gave third preference to students residing in the neighborhood. Second, since this Courts decision in Brown, the law has consistently and unequivocally approved of both voluntary and compulsory race-conscious measures to combat segregated schools. 149 through 154 (Dec. 8, 2003). The fact that it is possible that children of group members will not be denied admission to a school based on their racebecause they choose an undersubscribed school or an oversubscribed school in which their race is an advantagedoes not eliminate the injury claimed. Doubtless, hundreds of letters like this went out from both school boards every year these race-based assignment plans were in operation. In many such instances, the contentious force of legal challenges to these classifications, meritorious or not, would displace earlier calm. This fundamental principle goes back, in this context, to Brown itself. See Welch 8391. See Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505506 (2005); ante, at 11. Seattles racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of students between schools. in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1952, No. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. The majority acknowledges that in prior cases this Court has recognized at least two interests as compelling: an interest in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination, and an interest in diversity in higher education. Ante, at 12, 13. 205, 961 F.2d 1335, 1338 (CA7 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) This litigation was commenced in July 2000, and the record in the District Court was closed before assignments for the 20012002 school year were made. Held:The judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded. See Swann, 402 U. S., at 31. The government bears the burden of justifying its use of individual racial classifications. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 393 (1981). In a separate conference, JCPS Representative Pat Todd emphasized that the current assignment plan would remain in effect for the 20072008 school year, citing the finalization of budgets, staffing, assignments and busing as prevailing reasons for no change being logistically possible. See Grutter, 539 U. S. 347348 (opinion of Scalia, J.). 1, pp. In 2001, the district adopted its plan classifying students as black or other in order to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests. At least one of the academic articles the dissent cites to support this proposition fails to establish a causal connection between the supposed educational gains realized by black students and racial mixing. 1986) (upholding rezoning plan under rational-basis review). Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 371 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Statement in School Comm. in No. If an educational interest that combines these three elements is not compelling, what is? [Footnote 2] If an oversubscribed school is not within 10 percentage points of the districts overall white/nonwhite racial balance, it is what the district calls integration positive, and the district employs a tiebreaker that selects for assignment students whose race will serve to bring the school into balance. Id., at 38a. The notion that a democratic interest qualifies as a compelling interest (or constitutes a part of a compelling interest) is proposed for the first time in todays dissent and has little basis in the Constitution or our precedent, which has narrowly restricted the interests that qualify as compelling. [Footnote 23] And foreshadowing todays dissent, the segregationists most heavily relied upon judicial precedent. In reality, it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement. These facts and circumstances help explain why in this context, as to means, the law often leaves legislatures, city councils, school boards, and voters with a broad range of choice, thereby giving different communities the opportunity to try different solutions to common problems and gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem to them best to suit their individual needs. Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)), cert. of Boston, the Illinois Supreme Court had issued an unpublished opinion holding unconstitutional a similar statute aimed at eliminating racial imbalance in public schools. The U.S. Constitution in Article III 2 specifies the scope of matters on which the federal courts can issue decisions. Supreme Court 5:4 decision suggests that the Court is divided in its interpretation of Brown and its intent in . The district retained a racial tiebreaker for oversubscribed schools, which takes effect only if the schools minority or majority enrollment falls outside of a 30% range centered on the minority/majority population ratio within the district. And second, Kennedy faults the dissent for ignoring the "presumptive invalidity of a State's use of racial classifications to differentiate its treatment of individuals.". None of these features is present in elementary and secondary schools. Transfer plans, for example, allowed students to shift from a school in which they were in the racial majority to a school in which they would be in a racial minority. Today, they cannot. PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, PETITIONER. 3, p.1617 (It is by such practical considerations based on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal protection is to be answered (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 110 (1949))); Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. This argument that different rules should govern racial classifications designed to include rather than exclude is not new; it has been repeatedly pressed in the past, see, e.g., Gratz, 539 U. S., at 282 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand, supra, at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wygant, 476 U. S., at 316317 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and has been repeatedly rejected. Part III A first reiterated that "when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny. of Jefferson Cty., 489 F.2d 925, 932 (CA6), vacated and remanded, 418 U. S. 918, reinstated with modifications, 510 F.2d 1358, 1359 (CA6 1974), and in 1975 the District Court entered a desegregation decree. Cf. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 472, n. 15 (1982). Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered. 05908, at 202a (noting that 89 nonwhite students were denied assignment to a particular school by operation of Seattles racial tiebreaker). Research suggests, for example, that black children from segregated educational environments significantly increase their achievement levels once they are placed in a more integrated setting. Several factors, taken together, nonetheless lead me to conclude that the boards use of race-conscious criteria in these plans passes even the strictest tailoring test. 1, a consolidated 2007 ruling that resolved both cases, the Court ultimately struck down the school plans at issue, holding that they violated the . This plan labeled racially imbalanced any school at which the percentage of black students exceeded by more than 20% the minority population of the school district as a whole. Yet the plurality would deprive them of at least one tool that some districts now consider vitalthe limited use of broad race-conscious student population ranges. The following notice, published in a Louisville newspaper in 1976, gives a sense of how the districts race-based busing plan operated in practice: Louisville Courier Journal, June 18, 1976 (reproduced in J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration 19541978, p. 176 (1979)). In particular, they emphasize that the children on whose high school admissions the case was originally based have since graduated high school, while the children of the other involved parents are not yet at the high school age. Question: In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 (2007), the Supreme Court ruled that O public school policies that assigned students to a school on the basis of race were constitutional. 1, 426 F. 3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. This argument is unavailing; the groups members have children in all levels of the districts schools, and the complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of members whose elementary and middle school children may be denied admission to the high schools of their choice in the future. Id. When asked for a range of percentage that would be diverse, however, Seattles expert said it was important to have sufficient numbers so as to avoid students feeling any kind of specter of exceptionality. App. It contains 34 countywide districts with central cities (the 11 Florida districts fit this description, plus Clark County, Nevada and others) and a small number of consolidated districts (New Castle County, Delaware and Jefferson County, Kentucky). 6, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 597598, 237 N.E. 2d 498, 501 (1968) (citations omitted) (citing decisions from the high courts of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, New York, and Connecticut, and from the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits). friend of JOSHUA RYAN McDONALD, PETITIONER. And Swann, McDaniel, Crawford, North Carolina Bd. As Jefferson County explains, the racial guidelines have minimal impact in this process, because they mostly influence student assignment in subtle and indirect ways. Brief for Respondents in No. In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. This is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come to regret. 458 U. S., at 535, n.11. Three of the oversubscribed schools were integration positive because the schools white enrollment the previous school year was greater than 51 percentBallard, Nathan Hale, and Roosevelt. In addition to these defects, the democratic element of the integration interest fails on the dissents own terms. in No. The groups members have children in the districts elementary, middle, and high schools, App. See ante, at 1517, 23 (concurring opinion). The first case started in 1998 when five African American high school students sued JCPS to allow them to attend Central High School, a magnet school. After agreeing to hear an appeal (Parents Involved, 2006) in Parents Involved In Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1 (2007), a highly divided Supreme Court f 6 struck down plans from Seattle and Louisville that classified students by race in making school assignments.